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I. INTRODUCTION
The first battle in complex commercial litigation is often fought
over removal and remand. Corporate defendants generally believe that
federal courts are a more efficient and sympathetic venue than state
courts, and will thus generally pursue removal whenever possible. In
contrast, Plaintiffs generally fight to keep lawsuits in state court because
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of their familiarity with local practice and the local judiciary.1 Although
these beliefs were likely developed through experience and anecdotal
evidence, studies have identified a “removal effect” that causes a
“precipitous drop in the plaintiffs’ win rate” in cases that are removed to
federal court.2 As if this impact on the ultimate issue of liability was not
enough, the importance of a district court’s decision on remand is further
emphasized by the finality of its decision, which is generally not
reviewable on appeal.3
Magistrate judges are increasingly being asked to resolve these
disputes and decide remand motions. However, there is a split within the
federal courts over whether these decisions are within the authority of
magistrate judges to “hear and determine.” Nearly every district court
has treated remand as nondispositive and thus within the scope of this
authority, but all four circuit courts that have confronted the issue have
deemed remand dispositive and thus beyond the scope of a magistrate’s
authority. Although seemingly trivial, the difference is significant
because district courts review magistrate judges’ findings on dispositive
motions under a de novo standard, while nondispositive motions receive
the less stringent review only for clear error of law.4 As a result, litigants
in circuits where such motions are treated as dispositive are effectively
afforded two chances to make the case for removal—once to the
magistrate judge and again to the district court judge on de novo
review—while those in circuits where remand motions are treated as
nondispositive will be left with no similar recourse. Because removal is
viewed as being largely outcome determinative, resolving this split and
applying a uniform standard of review to these decisions is crucial.
This article seeks to explore the split between the district courts and
the circuit courts over whether remand is dispositive or nondispositive,
and in the process, provide an interesting peek into the history of
magistrate judges and the expanding role that these judges (before whom
1

E.g., RICHARD G. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 235 (2d ed.
1997) (“Commonly, the defendants will remove a case . . . for the same reasons many
plaintiffs invoked that jurisdiction—to avoid possible bias of a local state court with its
locally elected judge.”)
2
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About The Legal System? Win Rates And Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 581, 593 (1998) (reviewing data collected from 1978-1991 and concluding that
plaintiffs’ “overall win rate in federal cases is 57.9%, but in the subset of those cases that
have been removed, the win rate is only 36.77%.”).
3
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except [for civil rights
cases].”).
4
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(a) (West 2005); FED R. CIV. P.
72(a).
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practitioners increasingly find themselves during litigation) will play in
the future. The first part of this article explores the history of magistrate
judges and the expansion of their authority to resolve a wide variety of
issues historically handled by district court judges. The second part
explores the split between the district courts and the circuit courts. The
third part suggests that remand motions should be within a magistrate
judge’s authority to “hear and determine” in light of the nature of
remand, the historical role magistrate judges have played and the steady
attempts by both the district courts (for whose benefit the magistrate
judges were created) and Congress (who created the position) to broaden
the scope of magistrate judges’ authority.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES AND THEIR AUTHORITY
Magistrate judges5 are “creatures of statute,” and their jurisdiction
thus extends only as far as the authority granted to them by Congress.6
Any attempt to define the limits of their jurisdiction must therefore begin
by analyzing the language of the Federal Magistrates Act (“the Act”) and
the intent of Congress when it created enacted the Act. “Cognizant of the
dictates of Article III, which require that only judges with tenure and
salary protection conduct core judicial business, Congress [] precluded
magistrate [judges] from issuing orders that ‘determine[] with finality the
duties of the parties.’”7 Stated differently, while Congress permitted
magistrate judges to hear all matters unconnected to issues litigated at
trial,8 only Article III judges are permitted to perform “inherently
judicial” tasks.9 Consistent with these concerns, the Act permits
magistrate judges to “hear and determine” all pretrial matters,10 except
for eight specific dispositive matters for which they can only submit
“proposed findings of fact and recommendations” to the district court for
de novo review.11 Remand is not included in the list of eight dispositive
matters that are beyond the authority of magistrate judges to “hear and
5
The formal title of the new judicial officers created by Congress in 1968 was
originally United States Magistrate. It remained this way until Congress changed the
name to United States Magistrate Judge in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. For
the sake of consistency, “magistrate judge” is used throughout this article.
6
E.g., NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1994) (“[F]ederal
magistrates are creatures of statute, and so is their jurisdiction. We cannot augment it; we
cannot ask them to do something Congress has not authorized them to do.”).
7
Campbell v. IBM, 912 F. Supp. 116, 118 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Frazier,
966 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1992)).
8
United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 585 (1st Cir. 1981).
9
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549 (1962).
10
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (West 2006).
11
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2006).
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determine.” While this is an important factor in analyzing whether
remand is beyond the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority, it is not
dispositive. Rather, to fully understand the issue and the context in which
it arises requires some understanding of both the evolution of the Act,
FED. R. CIV. P. 72, which was enacted to implement certain amendments
to the Act, and the steady expansion of the authority with which
magistrate judges have been entrusted by Congress.
A. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT12
In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631-639 (1968), and established the position of federal magistrate
judge to upgrade and expand the United States Commissioner system
that had existed in the federal courts since 1793.13 “The Act grew from
Congress’ recognition that a multitude of new statutes and regulations
had created an avalanche of additional work for the district courts which
could be performed only by multiplying the number of judges or giving
judges additional assistance.”14 The new judicial position was thus
created to act as an adjunct to district court judges and help alleviate the
burden imposed on them by ever expanding caseloads in the federal
courts.
In the years since the Act was first passed into law, Congress has
generally afforded district courts leeway to experiment with different
uses for magistrate judges and has periodically amended the Act to
codify the techniques developed by enterprising courts.15 It is in this
spirit that district courts have increasingly permitted magistrate judges to
adjudicate a growing number of substantive, pretrial matters, including
removal and remand.

12
This section is not intended to be an exhaustive history of the Federal Magistrates
Act, but is instead focused on the development of the Act as it relates to the expanding
authority of magistrate judges, and specifically, the authority of magistrate judges to hear
and determine remand motions. For a more detailed explanation of the changing role of
magistrate judges over the years, see, e.g.: Philip M. Pro, Measured Progress: The
Evolution And Administration Of The Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1503 (1995); A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D.
247 (June 1993) (prepared by the Magistrate Judges Division of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; Christopher Smith, From U.S. Magistrates to U.S.
Magistrate Judges, 75 Judicature 210, 211 (1992); Note, Article III Constraints And The
Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J.
1023 (1979).
13
E.g., United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713, 719–20 (S.D.N.Y 1920).
14
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 267 (1976).
15
Note, supra note 12, at 1028 (“[M]uch of the post-1968 legislation has either
systematized magistrate reference techniques pioneered by innovative district courts or
removed case-law and legislative obstacles to their further development.”).
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The United States Commissioner System that Congress sought to
replace in 1968 traced its origins to the early days of the United States.
While the title of “Commissioner” was only created in 1896, Congress
had, as early as 1793, authorized the federal circuit courts to appoint
“discreet persons learned in the law” to take bail and perform certain
other ministerial functions.16 From this “seed,” the position and authority
of the Commissioners grew steadily through the 1800s and early 1900s.17
Nonetheless, however useful these Commissioners may have been to the
district courts, their shortcomings became obvious as the judiciary
matured and the caseload of the federal courts expanded. Commissioners
received no formal training from the federal judiciary and had no official
staff, clerks, or offices.18 They were paid under an “anachronistic fee
system” that was based on the “nature and number” of matters they
handled.19 They were not prohibited from having a “direct” and
“substantial” pecuniary interest in the matters they were adjudicating.20
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, there was no requirement that
Commissioners be lawyers or even trained in the law, even though they
were often “called upon to apply some of the most sophisticated rules of
constitutional law—rules that the best attorneys and judges are hard
pressed to apply correctly.”21
By 1965, these shortcomings became too obvious to ignore and
Congress began holding hearings to examine the roles Commissioners
played and to attempt to improve the system. From these hearings, two
conflicting proposals emerged. The first would have effectively
eliminated the office and required district court judges to assume the
responsibilities previously undertaken by the Commissioners.22 The
second, which was “overwhelmingly favored” by Congress,23 was to
reform the system rather than abandon it altogether:

16

Maresca, 266 F. at 719–20.
Id. at 720.
18
H.R. REP. NO. 90–1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4256
(noting that “[a]ll but a handful of Commissioners—those with full time appointments,
who are prohibited from practicing law—must meet the expenses of their office from
their own resources” and identifying the “lack of any effective administrative apparatus
within the judiciary” to assist or train Commissioners).
19
Id. In addition to being complicated, the fee system was capped at $10,500 per
year, thus making it difficult to “attract the best men for the job” because the “busiest
Commissioners [were] grossly underpaid.”
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 4257; see also Hon Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges,
Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Two: The Third Branch
Reacts” 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.. 165, 168 (2007).
23
Mund, supra note 22, at 168.
17
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Although the present U.S. Commissioner system is in
many ways defective it is neither practical nor
desirable simply to abolish the Commissioner system
and transfer the functions now performed by that
office to the U.S. district court judges, who are
already overburdened by their present duties . . . .24

Accordingly, Congress sought to create an “upgraded system of
judicial officers” and increase the “scope of the responsibilities that can
be discharged by that office,” with the ultimate goal being to increase the
“overall efficiency of the federal judiciary.”25
The 1968 Act was thus an attempt by Congress to “update and
make more effective a system that [was not] altered basically for over a
century, and to cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S. district
courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of
judicial officers.”26 The Act rectified the shortcomings in the
Commissioner system by giving magistrate judges a fixed term of office,
eliminating the outdated and conflict-ridden fee system, and requiring
that all magistrate judges be licensed attorneys.27 Congress also codified
the authority of magistrate judges to exercise all powers formerly
exercised by the Commissioners, and empowered them to try a wide
variety of additional matters with the consent of the parties.28
Congress also authorized magistrate judges to perform “additional
duties” assigned by the district courts provided these duties were “not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”29
Congress intended to leave open ended the “additional duties” with
which these new judicial officers could be tasked. The reason for this
was twofold. First, Congress was apprehensive about the magistrate
judges system, with many members questioning the wisdom and
constitutionality of the new position it had created, particularly to the
extent that it might allow district judges to improperly delegate to
magistrate judges duties reserved to Article III judges.30 Second, and
more relevant for our purposes, Congress intended that the district court
judges would experiment with the assignment of “additional duties” to
magistrate judges to suit the needs of the district courts.31 As discussed
below, these concerns resurface in the debate over whether magistrate
24

H.R. REP. NO. 90-1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4257.
Id.
26
Id. at 4255.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 4253–54.
29
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1629 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4269
30
Id. at 4269.
31
Id. at 4253–62.
25

2009]

ARE REMAND MOTIONS DISPOSITIVE?

309

judges can “hear and determine” remand motions, with those opposed to
the practice citing Article III concerns, and those in favor arguing that
district judges should be permitted to experiment by allowing magistrate
judges to issue remand orders.
As originally drafted, the Act included three examples of such
“additional duties” that could be handled by magistrate judges—to serve
as special masters in civil lawsuits, to assist with pretrial discovery
matters, and to conduct preliminary review of applications for post-trial
relief—but made clear that this list was not exhaustive. Nonetheless, this
intention was misapprehended by the Supreme Court in the first case in
which it had occasion to review the Act. In Wingo v. Wedding, the Court
ruled that magistrate judges could not preside over habeas corpus
proceedings because nothing in the text or legislative history of the Act
indicated that Congress intended to change the requirement that Article
III judges preside over such proceedings, nor did the Act specifically
prescribe such a practice.32 In dissent, Justice Burger (joined by Justice
White) criticized the majority for having ignored the stated purpose of
Congress when it enacted the Act—to permit district judges to utilize
magistrate judges to relieve the burden on the district courts.33 Justice
Burger closed his dissenting opinion by indicating that the Court had
“construed [the Act] contrary to clear legislative intent” and suggested
that it was now “for the Congress to act to restate its intentions if its
declared objectives are to be carried out in the discretion of a judge of the
district court.”34
Congress took Justice Burger’s advice and, in 1976, amended the
Act to “clarify and further define the additional duties which may be
assigned to a United States Magistrate [Judge].”35 Among other things,
the magistrate judges’ duties were expanded to include the ability to
“hear and determine any pretrial matter” subject only to review and
reconsideration by a district court if a magistrate judge’s ruling was
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”36 However, Congress excluded
eight specific motions from this expanded authority, including motions:
32
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468, 470 (1974), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), as recognized in Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). The
Court did not reach the issue of whether permitting magistrate judges to preside over
habeas corpus proceedings would be “consistent” with the Constitution. As is its practice,
the Court read the language of the statute narrowly so as to avoid reaching the
constitutional issue. Id. at 467 n. 4.
33
Id. at 475–76.
34
Id. at 487.
35
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6162; see also
Gomez, 490 U.S. at 867.
36
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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(1) for injunctive relief; (2) for judgment on the pleadings; (3) for
summary judgment; (4) to dismiss or quash an indictment or information
made by the defendant; (5) to suppress evidence in a criminal case; (6) to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action; (7) to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (8) to
involuntarily dismiss an action.37 For these matters, magistrate judges
were permitted to conduct evidentiary hearings and recommend
dispositions, but the district court was required to “make a de novo
determination”38 of any portion of the recommendation objected to by
one of the parties.
Congress was compelled to amend the Act in response to Wingo
and another Supreme Court decision, Mathews v. Weber,39 which
interpreted the Act narrowly as permitting district judges to assign to
magistrate judges only those duties specifically set forth in the Act.
Congress rejected this interpretation as being inconsistent with one of the
foundational purposes of the Act, which was to allow district judges the
flexibility to utilize magistrate judges in whatever manner best allowed
the district judges to devote more time to the “actual trial of cases” and
the writing of opinions:40
Under this subsection, the district courts would
remain free to experiment in the assignment of other
duties to magistrates which may not necessarily be
included in the broad category of “pretrial matters.”
...
If district judges are willing to experiment with the
assignment to magistrates of other functions in the aid
of the business of the courts, there will be increased
time available to judges for the careful and unhurried
performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory
duties.41

While this freedom was ultimately constrained by the requirement that
any duties assigned to a magistrate judge not be “inconsistent with the
Constitution or the laws of the United States,”42 Congress made clear
37

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
The term de novo signifies that the magistrate judge’s findings are not protected by
the clearly erroneous doctrine, but does not necessarily require the district court judge to
conduct a second evidentiary hearing. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
39
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
40
Id. at 272 n.7 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1065, at 3 (1972)); see also McCarthy v.
Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1981).
41
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609 at 12.
42
Id.
38
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with its 1976 amendments to the Act that it did not intend to dictate to
district court judges the best uses of magistrate judges within these broad
constraints.
Congress again amended the Act in 1979. By this time,
Congressional doubts about the utility and ability of magistrate judges
had subsided and Congress recognized that the magistrate system
“[played] an integral and important role in the Federal judicial system.”43
Accordingly, “Congress enlarged the magistrate’s jurisdiction over civil
and criminal trials, codifying some of the experiments conducted under
the Act’s additional duties clause.”44 Among other things, the 1979
amendments permitted a magistrate judge, with the consent of the
parties, to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case and required the
district judge to notify the parties of this opportunity.45 Thus, with the
1976 and 1979 amendments, Congress enlarged the jurisdiction and
expanded the authority of magistrate judges to conform to the prevailing
practices in the various district courts.
Finally, in 1990 Congress amended the Act to formally change the
title of the magistrates’ position from United States Magistrate to United
States Magistrate Judge.46 The change was enacted to correct the many
“practical problems” created because “lawyers did not accord the
subordinate judicial officers with appropriate deference and respect.”47
Congress felt the name change was needed to “help educate attorneys
and litigants about the magistrate judges’ status as authoritative judicial
officers within the federal courts.”48 Though largely symbolic, this name
change marks the end of a process that saw the position of magistrate
judge rise from one that Congress viewed with caution and guarded
optimism to full-fledged “judicial officers.”
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72
FED R. CIV. P. 72 was enacted in 1983 to implement the 1976
amendments to the Act.49 Prior to the enactment of Rule 72, there had
been no uniform, federal rules governing either the procedures district
courts were to follow when referring matters to magistrate judges or the
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

H.R, REP. NO. 96-287 at 5 (1979).
Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1).
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
Smith, supra note 12.
Id. at 212.
FED R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee’s note.
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procedures magistrate judges were to follow in carrying out their
duties.50 Congress essentially left it to the individual district courts to
develop local rules on these issues, but this approach ultimately proved
unworkable because local rules, when enacted at all, were often
inaccessible and inconsistent across jurisdictions.51 Accordingly
Congress enacted FED. R. CIV. P. 72 to resolve these discrepancies,
establish uniform standards, and provide guidance to district courts and
magistrate judges alike.52
Rule 72(a) governs “nondispositive matters,” and provides that
magistrate judges may “hear and determine” any such matters and “enter
into the record a written order setting forth the disposition of the matter.”
Rule 72(b) governs “dispositive motions,” and provides that magistrate
judges may only conduct evidentiary hearings into such matters and
“enter into the record a recommendation for disposition of the matter.”53
Under either subsection, the parties have 10 days to “serve and file”
objections to the magistrate judge’s decision with the district court, and
the district court maintains the ultimate authority to “modify or set aside
any portions of the magistrate judge’s” that it finds objectionable.54
However, consistent with the terms of the Act, Rule 72 mandates that a
magistrate judge’s order issued on a nondispositive matter is reviewed by
the district court under the highly-deferential “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law” standard,55 while the “report and recommendation” from
the magistrate judge on a dispositive matter is reviewed de novo by the
district court.56
While Rule 72 divides pretrial motions into “dispositive” and
“nondispositive” matters, neither these terms nor the distinction they
create appears in the Act. Instead, the Act permits magistrate judges to
“hear and determine any pretrial matter” with the exception of the eight
motions identified in subsection 636(b)(1)(B). This apparent
inconsistency has caused some confusion among courts and
commentators over how certain motions should be classified for
50
See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3067 (2d ed. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §
636(b)(4) (“Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrate
judges shall discharge their duties.”).
51
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50; § 636(b)(4).
52
In addition to Rule 72, Congress also enacted Rules 73–76 to establish the
procedures to be followed by district courts and magistrate judges when matters are
referred to the magistrate judges for trial on consent of the parties. See FED R. CIV. P.
73-76.
53
FED R. CIV. P. 72.
54
Id.
55
FED R. CIV. P. 72(a).
56
FED R. CIV. P. 72(b).
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purposes of determining the appropriate level of review by the district
court. Under one view, the terms “dispositive” and “nondispositive” are
interpreted as being “synonymous with the statute’s language” and thus
the “dispositive” motions for which de novo review is required are only
those eight specific motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(B).57 Under
the competing view, “dispositive” motions are not limited to these eight
motions, but include “at the very least, the eight motions listed in the
statute” along with any other motions that are “dispositive of a claim or
defense of a party.”58 As discussed below, this dispute—which is
essentially over whether the list of eight motions in section 636(b)(1)(B)
is exhaustive or illustrative—animates the split between the district
courts and the circuit courts over whether magistrate judges can “hear
and determine” remand motions.
III. THE SPLIT
Unlike a traditional “split” in the federal courts, where different
circuits disagree over an issue, all the circuit courts that have confronted
the issue discussed in this article have concluded that remand is a matter
that is beyond the authority of a magistrate judge to “hear and
determine.” However, district courts have consistently rejected this
approach, and have continued to permit magistrate judges to “hear and
determine” remand motions subject only to review for clear error of law,
even after the contrary trend in the circuit courts became clear.59 Thus,
though unorthodox, the “split” discussed below is no less important,
57

E.g., Meier v. Premier Wine & Spirits, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 239, 242–43
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Rule 72’s references to ‘dispositive’ and ‘nondispositive’ orders is
intended to be synonymous with the statute’s language.”); Adkins v. Mid-American
Growers, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 171, 175 n.3, 176 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“‘Dispositive’ is merely a
term used to describe the motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(A) . . . . The terms
‘dispositive’ and ‘nondispositive’ in Rule 72 do not create categories separate from the
statute which Rule 72 implements.”).
58
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50, at 332–38. In support of this conclusion, Wright
and Miller note that proponents of the 1976 revisions to the Federal Magistrates Act
divided pretrial activities into dispositive and nondispositive matters when debating the
revisions. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94–1609 (1976) (“The bill provides for different
procedures depending upon whether the proceeding involves a matter preliminary to trial
or a motion which is dispositive of the action.”). These characterizations—which are
inherently assumed to be broader than what was ultimately included in the Act—were
purportedly motivated by Congress’s concerns that non-Article III judges might
“ultimately determine” matters dispositive of a case. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50, at
334. Wright and Miller further support their position by noting that various courts that
applied the Act prior to the enactment of Rule 72 generally did not limit the matters for
which de novo review was applied to only those eight motions identified in the Act. Id. at
334–36.
59
Obviously this has not been the case in district courts within the Second, Third,
Sixth or Tenth Circuits, where the circuit courts have spoken on the issue.
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particularly to the extent that it reveals the different ways the federal trial
courts and federal appeals courts view the role of magistrate judges and
the overall management of the ever-growing case loads of the district
courts.
Nearly every district court that has confronted the issue has
concluded that remand motions are nondispositive and can be determined
by magistrate judges subject only to review by the district court for clear
error of law.60 Most of these courts arrived at this conclusion through a
strict reading of both the Act and Rule 72 that focuses on: (1) remand not
being included in the list of matters identified in the Section 636
(b)(1)(B) as being beyond the authority of magistrate judges to “hear and
determine” with limited review from the district court; and (2) remand
not being dispositive for purposes of Rule 72 because it is not the
functional equivalent of any of the dispositive motions contained in
section 636(b)(1)(A).
For certain district courts, resolving the issue of whether remand
orders should be subject to “clearly erroneous” or de novo review is a
simple matter of reading the Act. For these courts, the list of eight
motions included in section 636(b)(1)(A) is exhaustive.61 Because
remand is not included on the list, it does not require such demanding
scrutiny and can instead be reviewed only for clear error of law. As one
district court in the Southern District of Texas noted:
60
E.g., Franklin v. Homewood, No. 07-TMP-006-S, 2007 WL 1804411, at * 2–4
(N.D. Ala. June 21, 2007); Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas,
397 F. Supp. 698, 700–02 (W.D.N.C. 2005); Johnson v. Wyeth, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1272,
1273–75 (N.D. Ala. 2004); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 56 F. Supp. 2d 859, 861–63
(W.D. Mich. 1999), rev’d 258 F.3d 509, 514–17 (6th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. IBM, 912
F. Supp. 116, 118–19 (D.N.J. 1996); Young v. James, 168 F.R.D. 24, 26–27 (E.D. Va.
1996); Delta Dental of R.I. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., 942 F. Supp. 740, 743–
46 (D.R.I. 1996); DeCastro v. AWACS, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 692, 694–96 (D.N.J. 1996);
Vaquillas Ranch Co. v. Texaco Exploration, 844 F. Supp. 1156, 1160–63 (S.D. Tex.
1994); Banbury v. Omnitrition Intern., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1993); City
of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 122, 123–24 (S.D. Miss.
1993); White v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 F.R.D. 639, 642–43 (D. Neb. 1993);
Holt v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., 802 F. Supp. 866, 868 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Doe v.
American Red Cross, 763 F. Supp. 1084, 1085 (D. Or. 1991); McDonough v. Blue Cross
of Northeastern Pa., 131 F.R.D. 467, 472 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Acme Electric Corp. v. Sigma
Instruments, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 26, 28 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); North Jersey Savings & Loan
Association v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 125 F.R.D. 96, 98–99 (D.N.J.
1988); Hitachi Cable Am., Inc. v. Wines, No. 85-4265, 1986 WL 2135, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb.
14, 1986); Jacobsen v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 594 F. Supp.
583, 586 (D. Maine 1984); see also Searcy v. Knostman, 155 B.R. 699, 702 (Bankr. S.D.
Miss. 1993); but see Giangola v. Walt Disney, 753 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1990); Long v.
Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 783 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.S.C. 1992).
61
See e.g., Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273; Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162;
Adkins, 143 F.R.D. at 175 n.3, 176; North Jersey Savings & Loan, 125 F.R.D. at 98;
Jacobsen, 594 F. Supp. at 586.
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This Court finds persuasive the reasoning and analysis
of those authorities holding that the term “dispositive”
refers to the list of motions that a magistrate judge
may not determine found in §636(b)(1)(A). . . .
Building on that foundation, this Court also believes
that the listing found in §636(b)(1)(A) is exhaustive
and reflects Congress’ intent that only those motions
that are listed be construed as dispositive and thus
outside the power of a magistrate judge to
determine.62

For these courts, a strict reading of the Act is required in order to
conform to Congress’s intent: “Congress had the opportunity to include
in that list any motion which it considered to be dispositive, and it did
not include motions to remand.”63 Moreover, according to courts that
take this narrow view of the Act, this interpretation reinforces the
original purposes behind the Act and the steady expansion of magistrate
judges’ authority, which was to “relieve the district courts of certain
subordinate duties that often distract the courts from more important
matters.”64
Other district courts view the fact that remand is not one of the
matters specifically mentioned in Section 636(b)(1)(A) as relevant to the
analysis but not by itself determinative of the issue.65 These courts focus
more on the nature of remand and whether it is the functional equivalent
of the motions included in Section 636(b)(1)(A) and should thus be
considered “dispositive” under Rule 72 and subject to a higher level of
review by district courts. While this approach is the same one followed
in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth circuit decisions discussed below,

62
Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162; see also Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273
(“If Congress had wanted to place remand of removed cases beyond the ‘hear and
determine’ authority of magistrate judges, it could should and would have listed is as one
of the matters expressly excluded from that authority.”); North Jersey Savings & Loan,
125 F.R.D. at 98 (“A motion to remand for improper removal is not listed [in Section
636(b)(1)(A)], and is therefore subject to ‘final’ determination by a magistrate.”);
Jacobsen, 594 F. Supp. at 586 (holding that remand was not one of the eight “excepted
actions” identified in Section 636 (b)(1)(A) and thus the appropriate standard of review to
be applied to such motions was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law”); cf Adkins, 143
F.R.D. at 176 (Rule 11 sanctions motion) (“‘Dispositive’ is merely a term used to
describe the motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(A) . . . . The terms ‘dispositive’ and
‘nondispositive’ in Rule 72 do not create categories separate from the statute which Rule
72 implements.”).
63
Id.
64
Id. (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991)).
65
Campbell, 912 F. Supp. at 119 (“That remand is not specifically mentioned in §
636(b)(1)(A) is relevant (although not critical) to the Court’s analysis.”).
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the result arrived at by the district courts is the opposite of the one
arrived at by the circuit courts.
The district courts that have adopted this approach have almost
universally determined that remand is not like the motions identified in
section 636(b)(1)(A), and should not be considered dispositive, because
remand does not resolve any claims, defenses, or substantive rights, but
instead merely transfers a lawsuit to a different forum.66 Unlike many of
the motions identified in section 636(b)(1)(A)—e.g., motions for
judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, or to involuntarily dismiss an action—remand “decides
only the question of whether there is a proper basis for federal
jurisdiction to support removal.”67 As a district court in the District of
Nebraska noted:

66
See, e.g., Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3 (“Granting or denying a motion for
remand does not bring about a final determination of a case: the case will simply be
remanded for determination by a state court or remain in federal court. Therefore, ruling
on a motion to remand is not a dispositive determination.”); Vogel, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 863
(“[A] motion for remand does not address the substance of a party’s claims or
defenses . . . . While . . . remand forecloses the maintenance of the action in a federal
forum, this Court does not believe that use of a particular forum should be identified as a
claim or defense of either party.”); Delta Dental, 942 F. Supp. at 746 (holding that
motions to proceed in forma pauperis and to strike pleadings have a “sense of finality”
that remand motions lack because remand still allows the parties to “assert all claims and
defenses” in state court); Campbell, 912 F. Supp. at 119 (holding that remand motions are
nondispositive, in part because, they “merely transfer the action to a different forum
rather than finally resolving the substantive rights and obligations of the parties”); City of
Jackson, 147 F.R.D. at 124 (“The motion to remand does not reach the merits of the
underlying dispute but instead decides only the questions of whether removal to the
federal court was proper. The parties remain free to litigate the merits of the case
following the disposition of the motion, whether in state or federal court.”); Holt, 802 F.
Supp. at 868 (“A motion to remand is not dispositive since a decision on the motion
decides only the question of whether there is a proper basis for federal jurisdiction to
support removal, and neither reaches nor determines the merits of a plaintiff’s
claim . . . .”); McDonough, 131 F.R.D. at 472 (“Remand merely determines that the
litigation shall take place in state court rather than federal court; thus we are authorized to
enter final order remanding the matter to state court.”); cf Robinson v. Eng, 148 F.R.D.
635, 640 (D. Neb. 1993) (motion for Rule 11 sanction) (“Congress clearly has not chosen
to categorize as ‘dispositive’ any ruling that resolves an issue. Rather, it is only those
rulings which finally resolve a party’s ‘claim or defense’ which are considered
‘dispositive’ within the meaning of § 636(b) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72.”); but see Haag v.
Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136 (D. Minn. 2002);
Giangola, 753 F. Supp. at 152 (holding that “a remand order is the equivalent of a
dismissal” and that “no issue is so accurately described as dispositive as a determination
which will destroy or uphold the Court’s jurisdiction); Long v. Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.S.C. 1992) (“The analysis of the court in
Giangola is the preferred approach to this case because it combines both the statutory
language with the practical effects of a dismissal from federal court.”).
67
Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3.

2009]

ARE REMAND MOTIONS DISPOSITIVE?

317

[A]n order of remand to a state court is not an order
similar to those adjudicative functions [reserved for
Article III judges], for two reasons: first, a remand
order does not terminate the litigation; and, second, it
does not dispose of the pending claim. The claim at
issue in this case . . . will continue to be litigated in
the state courts; the order of remand will not alter the
parties’ opportunity to advocate their positions or to
be ably heard in a court of law. Nor should remanding
the case change in any way the outcome of that claim
on the merits.68

Tellingly, district courts outside of the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits have continued to adopt this interpretation of Rule 72
even in the face of the unanimous rejection of the approach by the these
circuit courts.69 For these district courts, a motion, such as one to remand
68

White, 153 F.R.D. at 643.
As a district court in the Western District of New York recently noted, prior to the
Second Circuit taking up the issue:
I respectfully disagree with [the analysis employed by the
Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits] for two reasons. . . . First . . .
[t]he [Federal Magistrates Act’s] plain language [] permits a
magistrate to hear and determine a pretrial motion for remand
under § 1447 . . . . Second, even assuming that a magistrate
lacks authority to issue a ‘dispositive’ order not listed in
§636(b)(1)(A), a remand order, unlike an order of dismissal, is
not dispositive. A dismissal ends a lawsuit. The disappointed
litigant may succeed in resuscitating his claim in another
forum, but only by commencing a new lawsuit, because the
dismissal order was dispositive of the original action. An order
of remand is not the functional equivalent. It neither disposes
of the merits of a party’s claim nor terminates the party’s
ability to seek such a disposition; most importantly, it in no
way ends the litigation, not even conditionally. To the contrary,
a remand order guarantees that a pending lawsuit will continue,
albeit in a different forum. Indeed, a remand to state court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447 of an action previously removed to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is in an important sense
precisely the opposite of an order of dismissal: whereas the
latter ends the parties’ lawsuit altogether, the former restores it
to its original status as an active case in a state court.
Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 243. Although somewhat less direct, other district courts have
also rejected the circuit courts’ approach to the issue:
Dispositive means “bringing about a final determination.”
[citing Black’s Law Dictionary]. Therefore the plain language
of Rule 72 is concerned only with whether a matter brings
about a final determination of a party’s claims or defenses; and
if a matter does not “‘resolve the substantive claims for relief
alleged in the pleadings,’ it is a nondispositive order.” A
motion to remand, like a motion related to venue, is concerned
69
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a lawsuit to state court, which does not bring about a final determination
of any claims or issues, cannot be dispositive for purposes of Rule 72.
As noted above, while nearly every district court faced with the
issue has determined that remand motions are nondispositive and can be
heard and determined by magistrate judges, all four of the circuit courts
that have considered the issue have come to the opposite conclusion,
holding that remand motions are dispositive and magistrate judges can
only provide a “report and recommendation” to the district court judge.70
In the first of these decisions, In re U.S. Healthcare,71 the Third Circuit
set forth the reasoning that would later be followed by the Second, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits, but rejected by the majority of district courts,
including some within the purview of these circuit courts. The Third
Circuit began by describing the “sharp distinction” in magistrate judges’
authority in connection with dispositive and nondispositive motions.72
Moreover, the court acknowledged that Congress did not include remand
motions on the list of dispositive motions that could not be adjudicated
by magistrate judges and thus, by its terms, the Federal Magistrates Act
did not preclude a magistrate judge from determining a remand motion.73
Nonetheless, the court concluded, in language that would be echoed by
its sister courts in later opinions, that the list of eight specific motions set
forth in Section 636(b)(1)(B) was not exhaustive and that a remand
motion was the “functional equivalent” of the motions included on this
list because it “conclusively terminates the matter in the federal court
against the will of the party who removed the case.”74 In support of its
opinion, the court analogized to a situation where a plaintiff files parallel
state and federal court lawsuits:
We do not think that anyone would argue seriously
that a magistrate judge, without consent of the parties,
could hear and determine a motion to dismiss the
federal action predicated on an absence of subject
only with which court will hear the claims and defenses not
with resolving the merits of those claims and defenses.
Therefore, as a remand order does not resolve or dispose of the
case, “the judge need only determine if the magistrate’s order
is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’”
Wachovia Bank, 397 F. Supp. at 701–02.
70
See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264–66 (2d Cir. 2008); Vogel v.
U.S. Office Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514–17 (6th Cir. 2001); First Union Mortg. Corp.
v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994–97 (10th Cir. 2000); In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142,
145–46 (3d Cir. 1998).
71
In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 147.
72
Id. at 145.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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matter jurisdiction, on the theory that the motion is
nondispositive because a parallel action is pending in
the state court. Yet in a practical sense an order of
remand predicated on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is no less dispositive than an order of
dismissal in the circumstances we describe as both
orders have the exact same effect by permitting the
case to proceed in the state rather than the federal
court.75

Ultimately, the court concluded that “Congress never intended to vest the
power in a non-Article III judge to determine the fundamental question
of whether a case could proceed in a federal court.”76
While the issue before the Third Circuit was one of first
impression for the federal circuit courts at the time, the court
acknowledged that the District Court for the District of New Jersey had
reached the issue and had concluded that remand motions were
nondispositive.77 The court rejected the district court’s reasoning, despite
observing that the court had “surveyed district court cases and concluded
that ‘the vast majority of the district courts within [the District of New
Jersey] and elsewhere that have confronted this issue have held that a
motion to remand is ‘nondispositive,’ and therefore, can be determined
by a magistrate judge by final order.”78 Based on its survey of the
available case law, the district court concluded that remand motions were
nondispositive because: (1) they were not included on the list of
dispositive motions specifically carved out of the magistrate judges
authority in the Act; and (2) remand did not “dispose of a claim or
defense,” but merely “transfers a case” from federal court to state court.79
The Third Circuit summarily rejected these conclusions, holding instead
that remand orders are dispositive of “all claims and defenses” because
they “banish the entire case from the federal court” and again compared
the decision to remand a case with one to dismiss a federal action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a parallel proceeding was
pending in state court.80
The Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits largely tracked the Third
Circuit’s reasoning in deciding that remand motions are dispositive for

75
76
77
78
79
80

In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46.
Id. at 146.
Id. (citing DeCastro v. AWACS, 940 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1996).
Id.
Id.
In re U.S.Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 146.
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purposes of a magistrate judge’s authority.81 All three courts concluded
that: (1) the list of eight dispositive motions included in the Act is
illustrative, not exhaustive;82 (2) the term “dispositive” in Rule 72 is not
limited to claims and defenses;83 and (3) a remand order is the
“functional equivalent” of an involuntary dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because it “banishes” the lawsuit from federal court,
and thus cannot be resolved by a magistrate judge.84
As noted above, despite the unanimity among the circuit courts on
whether remand is dispositive, district courts that have confronted the
issue in the wake of In re U.S. Healthcare, Vogel, First Union, and
Beemiller have rejected their rationale and continued to deem such
motions nondispositive and thus within a magistrate judge’s authority to
“hear and determine” subject only to review for clear error of law.85 Each
of these courts acknowledged the “split” in the federal courts but
ultimately adopted the approach taken by the district courts:
This court finds the reasoning of [courts in our own
district], as well as the reasoning of other district
courts, more persuasive that that of the Third, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits and determines that a motion to
remand is a nondispositive issue and within the
authority of a magistrate judge.86

81
See Williams, 527 F.3d at 264–66; Vogel, 258 F.3d at 514–17; First Union, 229
F.3d at 994–96.
82
See Williams, 527 F.3d at 265; Vogel, 258 F.3d at 514–15; First Union, 229 F.3d at
996.
83
Id.
84
See Williams, 527 F.3d at 266 (“Because a § 1447(c) remand order ‘determines the
fundamental question of whether a case could proceed in a federal court, it is
indistinguishable from a motion to dismiss the action from federal court based a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction for the purpose of [the Federal Magistrates Act]’”) (internal
citation omitted); see also Vogel, 258 F.3d at 517 (“[W]e apply a functional equivalency
test to see if a particular motion has the same practical effect as a recognized dispositive
motion. Applying that test, and adopting the analysis of the Third and Tenth Circuits, we
too find that a remand order is the functional equivalent of an order to dismiss.”); First
Union, 229 F.3d at 996 (“A remand order is a final decision in the sense that it is
‘dispositive of all the claims in the case as it banishes the entire case from the federal
court” . . . It is thus very similar in effect to an involuntary dismissal . . . for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.”). As noted in supra, note 40 a small minority of district
courts have followed this same rationale.
85
E.g., Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at ** 2–3; Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 700–
03; Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 241–44; Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273–75.
86
See Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 2; see also Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at
701, 702 (noting that there is “trouble at each step of [the] process” employed by the
circuit courts, “finding Vogel and First Union unpersuasive,” before holding that a
“magistrate judge may hear and determine a motion to remand, subject only to ‘clearly
erroneous or clear error of law’ review by a district court”); Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at
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This explicit rejection of countervailing circuit court authority,
albeit non-binding authority, is telling. What it reveals is an apparent
desire on the part of district courts to permit magistrate judges to “hear
and determine” remand motions. As discussed below, this is ultimately
the better reasoned approach because it adheres more closely to both the
letter and the spirit of the Federal Magistrates Act, which was created, at
least in part, to permit the district courts to experiment with the
responsibilities delegated to magistrate judges in order to effectively
manage their ever-increasing caseload and “increase the overall
efficiency of the federal judiciary.”87
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Plain Language Of The Federal Magistrates Act Permits
Magistrate Judges To “Hear And Determine” Remand Motions
“The starting point for the interpretation of a statute is always its
language.”88 This “preeminent canon of statutory interpretation” requires
that we “presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says.”89 As a result, any inquiry into the
meaning of a statute “begins with the statutory text, and ends there as
well if the text is unambiguous.”90 In this case, the legislative will
regarding the scope of a magistrate judge’s mandate was expressed in
unambiguous terms in Congress’s vesting in magistrate judges the
authority to “hear and determine any pretrial matter” except for a list of
eight specific motions.91 Remand is not included in this list. As a result,
the clear language of the Act supports the conclusion that magistrate
judges should be permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions.
Congress was unequivocal in the language it chose to use when
revising the Act to broaden the scope of magistrate judges’ authority
except in connection with certain specific motions. As one district court
noted: “Congress would be hard-pressed to use language more clearly
indicating its intent to create an exhaustive list that “any . . . except.”92
Had Congress intended to exclude remand from the scope of a magistrate
1273 (“This court finds the reasoning of the above-cited district courts more persuasive
that the reasoning of the above-captioned courts of appeal.”).
87
Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
88
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).
89
BedRoc, Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citing Connecticut
Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–254(1992)).
90
Id.
91
28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
92
Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 698 (emphasis omitted).
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judges’ authority, it “could, should, and would” have done so.93
“Because Congress explicitly set out matters that are not within the
authority of a magistrate judge and because remand is not among them, a
decision regarding remand is a valid authority of a magistrate judge.”94
If there was any doubt about whether Congress intended the list of
motions included in Section 636(b)(1)(A) to be exhaustive or illustrative,
it is resolved by the legislative history surrounding the 1976
Amendments to the Act. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports
that accompanied those Amendments included language evidencing
Congress’s clear intent that only certain, specific motions would be
placed beyond the authority of magistrate judges.95 For instance, the
House Committee Report, which identified the 1976 Amendments as
being designed to “clarify and further define the additional duties which
may be assigned” to a magistrate judge, draws a distinction between a
broad category of pretrial motions that a magistrate judge can “hear and
determine,” and “certain dispositive motions” for which a magistrate
judge can only provide a report and recommendation to the district
judge.96 The point is made even more clearly later on in the House
Report:
[C]ertain motions which are dispositive of the
litigation are specifically excepted from the
magistrate’s power . . . to “hear and determine.”
These excepted motions are:
(1) A motion for injunctive relief;
(2) A motion for judgment on the pleadings;
(3) A motion for summary judgment;
(4) A motion to dismiss or quash an indictment made
by defendant;
(5) A motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case;
(6) A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; and

93
Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (“If Congress had wanted to place remand of
removed cases beyond the ‘hear and determine’ authority of magistrate judges, it could,
should, and would have listed it as one of the matters expressly excluded from that
authority. Despite several amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act over the years,
Congress has not seen fit to insert such a limitation in magistrate judge authority.”); see
also Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411.
94
Franklin, 2007 WL 1804411 at * 3 (emphasis in original).
95
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, 617–71.
96
Id.
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(7) A motion to involuntarily dismiss an action for
failure to comply with an order of the court.97

Thus, Congress not only indicated that only certain dispositive
motions should be subject to de novo review, not all dispositive motions,
but also identified those “certain” motions. The House and Senate
Reports make clear that Congress intended that the motions identified in
Section 636(a)(1)(B)—regardless of whether they are characterized as
“dispositive” or “excepted”—were intended to be an exhaustive list of
the motions that fell beyond the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority.
Because remand is not on the list, it should not be seen as being beyond
the power of a magistrate judge to “hear and determine.”
Reading the Act to permit magistrate judges to “hear and
determine” remand motions is not only consistent with the plain
language of the Act, but also accords with the canon of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Under this principle of statutory construction, the
express inclusion of certain items on a list implies the exclusion of other
items not included on the list.98 Congress’s express inclusion of eight
specific motions that are beyond a magistrate judge’s authority implies
that magistrate judges are permitted to “hear and determine” any motions
not included on the list. While the Supreme Court has noted that this
canon “does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping,”99 it does
apply in situations, such as this one, where there is evidence that “the
items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.”100 Here, this evidence exists in the text of the Act, the
97

Id. Note that the House Report included in the list of “excepted motions” a motion
for involuntarily dismissal “for failure to comply with an order of the court,” whereas the
final version of the Act was less specific in its reference to motions “to involuntarily
dismiss an action.” This appears to cut against the position adopted by the Third Circuit
in In re U.S. Healthcare, and subsequently followed by the Second, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits, that a remand motion is akin to a motion to involuntarily dismiss an action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as it appears that Congress intended the “involuntary
dismissal” exception to be more narrow than these courts believe it to be.
98
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620–21 (8th ed. 2004).
99
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).
100
Id. (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). Although beyond the
scope of this article, Justice Scalia criticized the majority decision in Barnhart for
suggesting that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine does not apply unless it
appears that Congress considered the specific items excluded from a list:
It is also an absurd limitation, since it means that the more
unimaginable an unlisted item is, the more likely it is not to be
excluded. Does this new maxim mean, for example, that
exceptions to the hearsay rule beyond those set forth in the
Federal Rules of Evidence must be recognized if it is unlikely
that Congress (or perhaps the Rules committee) “considered”
those unnamed exceptions? Our cases do not support such a
proposition. There is no more reason to make a “case

324

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 5:303

exclusive nature of which is reinforced by the clear statements of
Congressional intent set forth in the Congressional Reports
accompanying the Act.101
As noted above, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
looked beyond the plain language of the Act and Rule 72 to determine
that remand was the “functional equivalent” of the dispositive motions
listed in section 636(b)(1)(A) and thus entitled to de novo review by the
district courts.102 This approach arose out of a belief that reading the list
as exhaustive might create Article III issues by permitting magistrate
judges to “exercise final decision making authority” over dispositive
motions not included on the list.103 These concerns are misplaced,
however, because district courts always maintain “final decision making
authority” over matters heard by magistrate judges, regardless of whether
such motions are characterized as dispositive or nondispositive. The only
difference is the standard that is applied by district courts to their review
of “certain dispositive matters” that are identified in section
636(b)(1)(A).
Congress never intended to vest magistrate judges with the
authority to issue final orders that would be immune from review by the
district courts. In fact, Congress intended that district courts would
maintain final control over matters handled by magistrate judges,
beginning with the requirement that district courts choose which
matters—dispositive and nondispositive—to designate to magistrate
judges and continuing to final review of magistrate judges’ decisions.104
unprovided for” exception to the clear import of an exclusive
listing than there is to make such an exception to any other
clear textual disposition. In a way, therefore, the Court’s
treatment of this issue has ample precedent-in those many
wrongly decided cases that replace what the legislature said
with what courts think the legislature would have said (i.e., in
the judges’ estimation should have said) if it had only
“considered” unanticipated consequences of what it did say (of
which the courts disapprove).
Id. at 180–81 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
101
Contra Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (doctrine of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where “expansive phrasing” used by
Congress—identifying consequences that “may include” a list of certain options—“points
directly away from . . . exclusive specification”) (emphasis added).
102
In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46; First Union, 229 F.3d at 995–96;
Vogel, 258 F.3d at 515–26; Williams, 527 F.3d at 264–65.
103
First Union, 229 F.3d at 996 (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d
1458, 1463 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also, In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145 (“In
considering this issue, we point out that we must take into account the ‘potential for Art.
III constraints in permitting a magistrate to make decisions on dispositive motions.’”).
104
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“[A] full-time United States . . . [magistrate judge] or a
part-time United States . . . [magistrate judge] who serves as a full-time judicial officer
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The Act and FED. R. CIV. P.72, collectively permit the district court to
“reconsider” any “pretrial matter”105 and “modify or set aside any portion
of [a] magistrate judge’s order [that is] found to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.”106This intention was further clarified by Congress in the
Reports that accompanied the 1976 amendments to the Federal
Magistrates Act:
The [Act] provides for different procedures depending
upon whether the proceeding involves a matter
preliminary to trial or a motion which is dispositive of
the action. In either case, the order or the
recommendation of the magistrate judge is subject to
final review by a judge of the court.107

Thus, Congress acknowledged the Article III concerns relied upon
by the circuit courts in support of the position that the list of motions
identified in section 636(b)(1)(A) is illustrative instead of exhaustive,
and addressed those concerns by requiring that “final decision making
authority” remain with the district courts.108 As a result, these
constitutional concerns do not support reading additional dispositive
motions into the list of “certain dispositive motions” for which de novo
review by the district court is required under the Act or Rule 72.

may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry
of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves.”); Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685–86 (Blackmun, J.
concurring) (noting that the district court is always “waiting in the wings, fully able to
correct errors” and thus failing to “perceive the threat to the judicial power or the
independence of the judicial decision making that underlies Art. III.”).
105
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
106
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a).
107
H.R. REP. NO. 94-609, 6162 (emphasis added)
108
E.g., Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (“As long as the remand order secures [the
right of review or reconsideration by a district court judge], there is certainly no
constitutional infirmity, much less any policy reason, precluding the vesting of remand
authority in magistrate judges.”). In Johnson, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama noted that, in both In re U.S. Healthcare and Vogel, there was no
opportunity for the parties to seek review by the district courts of the magistrate judges
remand orders because the terms of the magistrates’ orders foreclosed any such review.
Id. at 1273 n. 1. As the Johnson court noted: “[I]mmediate remand clearly does raise
constitutional concerns about maintaining the Article III judge’s duty to oversee the work
of the magistrate judge.” Id. However, no such concerns are presented where there is the
opportunity for review of a magistrate judge’s order by a district court judge. By contrast,
bankruptcy court judges, who are also non-Article III judges, are permitted to enter final
orders that are not subject to automatic review by district courts in the manner that
magistrate judges’ orders (or recommendations) are reviewed, and this practice has
survived constitutional scrutiny. E.g., FED R. BANKR. P. 8001, 8002.
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B. Remand Motions Are Not Dispositive Because They Do Not Resolve
Any Claims Or Defenses.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dispositive” as “bringing about a
final determination.”109 Based on this definition, numerous district courts
have concluded that remand is not dispositive because it does not bring
about a final determination of any claims or defenses in a case, but
instead simply determines whether those claims and defenses will be
adjudicated in state or federal court.110 As the District Court for the
Western District of New York has noted:
[A] remand order, unlike an order of dismissal, is not
dispositive. A dismissal ends a lawsuit . . . An order
of remand is not the functional equivalent. It neither
disposes of the merits of a party’s claim nor
terminates the party’s ability to seek such a
disposition; most importantly, it in no way ends the
litigation, not even conditionally. To the contrary, a
remand order guarantees that a pending lawsuit will
continue, albeit in a different forum. Indeed, a remand
to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is in an
important sense precisely the opposite of an order of
dismissal: whereas the latter ends the parties’ lawsuit
altogether, the former restores it to its original status
as an active case in state court.111

Stated differently, remand does not resolve any substantive issues
between the parties and does not end the litigation, thus it cannot be said
to “bring about a final determination” of the dispute in a manner similar
to the other motions listed in section 636(b)(1)(A). Even commentators
who do not interpret the list of motions enumerated in section
636(b)(1)(A) to be exhaustive nonetheless agree that remand is not
dispositive because it does not resolve the claims or defenses of the
parties: “the desire of a party to proceed in federal court cannot
reasonably be considered a claim, and therefore rulings on motions to
remand removed cases should not be considered dispositive.”112
The legislative history of the Act further supports this reading of
the term “dispositive,” and is more consistent with Congressional intent
109

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (8th ed. 2004).
See supra note 66; see also Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23,
26 (D.D.C. 2001) (defining a dispositive motion as “a motion that, if granted, would
result either in the determination of a particular claim on the merits or elimination of such
a claim from the case.”).
111
Meier, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
112
12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3068.2 (p. 340) (2d ed. 1997).
110
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than the contrary reading adopted by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits. As set forth in the House Report that accompanied the 1976
amendments to the Act, Congress only intended to remove from the
scope of a magistrate judge’s authority “certain motions” that were
“dispositive of the litigation” or “dispositive of the matter.”113 As noted
above, remand is not dispositive of the litigation or the matter because it
does not resolve any substantive issues related to any claims or defenses
at issue, but instead simply forces the parties to litigate these issues in
state court rather than federal court.
In addition to being more true to the meaning of the term
dispositive and the letter and spirit of the Act, characterizing remand as
nondispositive is also consistent with the practical implications of
remand. On remand, a lawsuit returns to the state court in the same
posture that it existed the moment before the remand order was entered.
Any pleadings that were filed between removal and remand are adopted
by the state court,114 and any unresolved motions filed while the case was
in federal court are transferred to the state court for resolution.115 It is as
if the case file simply gets handed back to the state court, updated with
whatever pleadings and motions were filed in federal court. In this
regard, remand is substantively indistinguishable from a motion to
transfer venue, which is undoubtedly within the scope of a magistrate’s
authority to “hear and determine.” As such, it is not dispositive as that
term is commonly understood.
This reading of the plain language of the Act and Rule 72 is further
buttressed by the fact that several jurisdictions have adopted local rules
to define “dispositive motions,” and none of them have characterized
remand as dispositive.116 For instance, the local rules for the District of
Nebraska define “dispositive matters” as those excepted by 28 U.S.C.
636(b)(1)(A).117 Rules like this one and similar ones enacted in other
jurisdictions effectively codify the decisions of the overwhelming
majority of district courts that the term “dispositive,” should be limited
113

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, at 6162, 6170–71.
E.g., Edward Hansen, Inc. v. Kearny Post Office Associates, 166 N.J. Super. 161,
170 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (“[T]he adoption of the pleadings would result in the
post-remand procedure in this court mirroring as nearly as possible the post-removal
procedure in the federal court . . . . Adoption of the federal pleadings would result in this
court’s renewing its jurisdiction with the case in exactly the same posture as when it was
remanded from the federal court.”).
115
E.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil, 890 F. Supp 1324, 1350 n.54 (S.D. Tex 1995)
(“Because these cases will be remanded, any unaddressed pending motion in these cases
must be addressed to the state courts.”).
116
E.g., D. NEB. L. CIV. R. 72.2(a); W.D. MICH. L. CIV. R.R. 7.2, 7.3; E.D. TEX L. CIV.
R. app B; see also CT. INT’L TRADE R. 7(g).
117
D. NEB. L. CIV. R. 72.2(a).
114
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consistent with the list of “certain dispositive motions” identified in the
Act.
The circuit courts have rejected this analysis and have instead
suggested that remand is the “functional equivalent” of a motion for
involuntary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because both
motions “banish” the case from the federal courts.118 This reasoning was
the lynchpin of the In re U.S. Healthcare decision and has been relied
upon by the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in adopting the Third
Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion. However, this analogy is ultimately
unpersuasive because dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
not an “adjudication on the merits” under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and thus, like remand, is not dispositive of an action.119 As the
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina has observed:
In the absence of three specific situations—one of
which is lack of subject matter jurisdiction—an
involuntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) is claim dispositive . . . . Therefore, it
is no surprise that involuntary dismissals were
included in the § 636(b)(1)(A) list, alongside motions
for summary judgment, motions under Rule 12(b)(6),
and motions for judgment on the pleadings. The fact
that Congress did not exclude the three exceptions to
the usual “adjudication upon the merits” of Rule 41(b)
when creating the § 636(b)(1)(A) list is no basis to
conclude that remand orders should likewise be
beyond the “hear and determine” power of a
magistrate judge.120

The analogy to motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction actually supports the conclusion that remand is not the
“functional equivalent” of the dispositive motions included in section
636(b)(1)(A). Like motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, remand does not bar the future litigation of the issues
involved in the lawsuit on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds.121
118
Williams, 527 F.3d at 266; First Union, 229 F.3d at 995–96; Vogel, 258 F.3d at
515–16; In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145–46.
119
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
120
Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. at 702; see also Young, 168 F.R.D. at 27 (“Involuntary
dismissals [] are governed by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that “a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication
upon the merits. Therefore, under this section, dismissals for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction are not considered to be final decisions of a party’s claims.”).
121
18A CHARLES A WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, n.1 (2d ed. 2002) (“There is little mystery about the

2009]

ARE REMAND MOTIONS DISPOSITIVE?

329

Thus, to the extent that remand is even comparable to a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the comparison actually
supports the notion that remand is not dispositive because, unlike the
dispositive motion identified in Section 636(b)(1)(A), remand is not a
final adjudication on the merits of a claim or defense.
C. Permitting Magistrate Judges To “Hear And Determine” Remand
Motion Is Consistent With Congressional Intent.
As noted above, Congress has steadily expanded the scope of
magistrate judges’ authority in an effort to “increase the overall
efficiency of the federal judiciary,”122 and has done so primarily by
“vesting magistrate judges with sufficient authority to . . . assist
effectively in managing the heavy caseload borne by the district
courts.”123 To this end, Congress intended to leave district judges free to
“experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in the
aid of the business of the courts,” in order to increase the “time available
to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital and
traditional adjudicatory duties.124 The Act and Rule 72 must be read
consistent with these intentions. Permitting magistrate judges to “hear
and determine” remand motions furthers this intent. In contrast, the
approach adopted by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits is the
type of narrow, non-pragmatic interpretation that Congress has
repeatedly rejected.
On the flip side, there is a danger not only in narrowing the types of
motions magistrate judges are permitted to “hear and determine,” but
also in adding to the list of matters that district courts must review de
novo. As a court in the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama recently noted:
If too many motions are added to the list of those
which a magistrate judge may not determine, the
purpose of the magistrate judge system is defeated
and they become little more than super briefing
res judicata effects of a judgment that dismisses an action for lack of subject-matter or
personal jurisdiction or for improper venue. Civil Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction or improper venue does not operate as an adjudication upon the
merits.”); contra Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1461–62 (10th Cir.
1988) (striking of pleadings with prejudice as sanction for discovery violation was
comparable to motion for involuntary dismissal under Section 636(B)(1)(A) because it
“has the effect of dismissing [plaintiff’s] action, contrary to [plaintiff’s] wishes, and
operates as res judicata.”).
122
Wachovia, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
123
Johnson, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
124
H. R. REP. NO. 94-1609 at 6172.
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clerks, writing recommendations that the district court
must review de novo. The district courts are thus
relieved of little, if any, of their case load and an
entire level of the federal judiciary is relieved of its
ability to assist in managing that case load . . . . [I]f
magistrate judges were not empowered to decide
motions which resolve issues, they “would not have
authority to ‘hear and determine’ much of what
dominates their dockets on a daily basis.”125

The district court for the District of Nebraska echoed this
sentiment, albeit in the context of a magistrate judge’s ability to order
Rule 11 sanctions, cautioning that only those “rulings which finally
resolve a party’s ‘claim or defense,’” should be considered dispositive or
else the usefulness of the magistrate judge to the district court will be
significantly curtailed:
Indeed, if this were the case magistrate judges would
not have authority to “hear and determine” much of
what dominates their dockets on a daily basis.
Magistrate judges in this court, and undoubtedly
many other district courts, routinely enter orders
which have the effect of disposing of many litigation
issues. For instance, magistrate judges enter: (1)
orders denying requests to proceed in forma pauperis;
(2) progression orders setting discovery deadlines and
trial dates; (3) orders granting and denying discovery
motions; (4) orders denying motions to join additional
parties; (5) orders denying motions to amend for
purposes of adding a claim or defense; (6) orders
striking pleadings for failure to comply with FED. R.
CIV. P. 8; (7) orders striking exhibits or witnesses for
failure to comply with the court’s progression order
under FED. R. CIV. P. 16; (8) preclusion orders
prohibiting the use of certain exhibits or testimony at
trial as a discovery sanction under Rule 37; (9)
protective orders under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); (10)
orders transferring cases to other districts or to the
Panel on Multi District Litigation; (11) orders
voluntarily dismissing claims or entire actions; and
(12) garnishment orders pursuant FED. R. CIV. P. 69.
Of course, this list is not intended to be exhaustive
and certainly there are a host of additional orders
125

Vaquillas Ranch, 844 F. Supp. at 1162–63 (citations omitted); see also Matthews,
423 U.S. at 268 (refusing to relegate magistrate judges to the role of “super-notaries”).
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routinely and properly entered by magistrate judges
which dispose of litigation issues.126

Accordingly, if magistrate judges are to continue to be a useful and
effective “lower tier of judicial officers” as Congress intended, they must
be permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions.

V. CONCLUSION
If district court judges can be seen as voting through their decisions
on this issue, then the results appear clear that they believe that
permitting magistrate judges to “hear and decide” remand motions would
“aid in the business of the courts” and “improve the overall efficiency”
of the federal judicial system. Given that magistrate judges were created
by Congress to assist district judges, this unanimity provides strong
support for the notion that the “experiment” of using magistrate judges to
“hear and determine” remand motions should be endorsed by the courts
and, if necessary, Congress when it next addresses the Act. Ultimately, in
light of the split between the district courts and the circuit courts
regarding the ability of magistrate judges to “hear and determine”
remand motions, there is once again a need to heed the advice of Justices
Burger and White in the Wingo decision and “act to restate its intentions
if its declared objectives are to be carried out in the discretion of a judge
of the district court.” Until this happens, magistrate judges should be
permitted to “hear and determine” remand motions, and the next circuit
court faced with the task of defining the scope of a magistrate judge’s
authority to “hear and determine” such motions should adhere more
closely to the letter and spirit of the Act when deciding the issue.

126

148 F.R.D. at 640 n.9.

